COUNTRY
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| Mosjeed of Thailand |
Formal Name: Kingdom of Thailand.
Short Form: Thailand (formerly Siam).
Term for Citizens: Thai.
Capital: Bangkok.
GEOGRAPHY
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| Thailand in map |
Size: Approximately 514,000 square kilometers.
Topography: Chief topographic features include central plain dominated by Mae Nam (river) Chao Phraya and its tributaries. To northeast rises dry, undulating Khorat Plateau bordered on east by Mekong River. Mountains along northern and western borders with Burma extend south into narrow, largely rain-forested Malay Peninsula. Network of rivers and canals associated with northern mountains and central plain drain, via Chao Phraya, into Gulf of Thailand. Mae Nam Mun and other northeastern streams drain via Mekong into South China Sea. Soils vary. Topography and drainage define four regions: North, Northeast, Center, and South.
Climate: Tropical monsoon climate. Southwest monsoons arriving between May and July signal start of rainy season lasting until October. Cycle reverses with northeast monsoon in November and December, ushering in dry season. Cooler temperatures give way to extremely hot, dry weather March through May. In general, rainfall heaviest in South, lightest in Northeast.
Topography: Chief topographic features include central plain dominated by Mae Nam (river) Chao Phraya and its tributaries. To northeast rises dry, undulating Khorat Plateau bordered on east by Mekong River. Mountains along northern and western borders with Burma extend south into narrow, largely rain-forested Malay Peninsula. Network of rivers and canals associated with northern mountains and central plain drain, via Chao Phraya, into Gulf of Thailand. Mae Nam Mun and other northeastern streams drain via Mekong into South China Sea. Soils vary. Topography and drainage define four regions: North, Northeast, Center, and South.
Climate: Tropical monsoon climate. Southwest monsoons arriving between May and July signal start of rainy season lasting until October. Cycle reverses with northeast monsoon in November and December, ushering in dry season. Cooler temperatures give way to extremely hot, dry weather March through May. In general, rainfall heaviest in South, lightest in Northeast.
ECONOMY
Salient Features: Mixed economy includes both strong
private sector and state enterprises; government assumes
responsibility for general infrastructure development. Basically
capitalist, committed to free trade. Rapid economic development
of 1960s and 1970s slowed by worldwide recession of early 1980s.
Strong recovery by 1987. Bangkok metropolitan area faced problems
of rapid modernization, including housing shortages and pressure
on such basic services as water, sewage, and health care.
| Statistic of Thai business |
Agriculture:Food surpluses produced by dominant
agricultural sector of enterprising, independent smallholders.
About 69 percent of labor force engaged in sector, and nearly 80
percent of population dependent on it for livelihood in the mid1980s .
Agricultural commodities accounted for some 60 percent of
export values in late 1980s. Major crops included rice, maize,
cassava, rubber sugarcane, coconuts, cotton, kenaf, and tobacco.
Forest cover decreased from more than 50 percent in 1961 to less
than 30 percent in 1987. Fisheries important for food supply and
foreign exchange earnings.
Industry: Modern enterprises mainly concentrated in Bangkok and surrounding provinces. Majority Thai owned, but joint foreign ventures numerous; state enterprises form important segment. In late 1980s, sector accounted for roughly 20 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and 30 percent of total exports. Main categories of manufacturing included food and beverages, textiles and apparel, and wood and mineral products. Mineral resources contributed about 2 percent to gross national product (GNP) and included tin, tungsten, fluorite, antimony, and precious stones, all significant foreign exchange earners.
Industry: Modern enterprises mainly concentrated in Bangkok and surrounding provinces. Majority Thai owned, but joint foreign ventures numerous; state enterprises form important segment. In late 1980s, sector accounted for roughly 20 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and 30 percent of total exports. Main categories of manufacturing included food and beverages, textiles and apparel, and wood and mineral products. Mineral resources contributed about 2 percent to gross national product (GNP) and included tin, tungsten, fluorite, antimony, and precious stones, all significant foreign exchange earners.
Energy Sources: Exploited domestic resources include
small oil fields, large lignite deposits, natural gas in Gulf of
Thailand, and hydroelectric power. Extensive, largely unevaluated
oil shale deposits also identified, but exploitation economically
infeasible in 1980s. Thermal (oil, natural gas, and lignite)
power generation accounted for about 70 percent of total 7,570
megawatt installed generating capacity in 1986; hydropower, which
remained largely unexploited, supplied about 30 percent.
Electricity generally available in Bangkok metropolitan area and
in about 43,000 of nation's some 48,000 villages (mostly near
Bangkok). Rural program under way for electrification of
remaining villages by late 1990s.
Foreign Trade: Major exports primary and processed agricultural products, tin, clothing, and other manufactured consumer goods. Major imports capital goods, intermediate products, and raw materials; petroleum products largest single import by monetary value since mid-1970s. Largest trading partners Japan and United States; trade with Japan characterized by large deficit.
Foreign Trade: Major exports primary and processed agricultural products, tin, clothing, and other manufactured consumer goods. Major imports capital goods, intermediate products, and raw materials; petroleum products largest single import by monetary value since mid-1970s. Largest trading partners Japan and United States; trade with Japan characterized by large deficit.
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT
In the 1960s and 1970s, the country's abundant natural
resources, an enterprising and competitive private sector, and
cautious and pragmatic economic management resulted in the
emergence of one of the fastest growing and most successful
economies among the developing countries. Between 1960 and 1970,
the country's average annual growth rate of gross domestic
product was 8.4 percent, compared with 5.8
percent for all middle-income, oil-importing countries. Between
1970 and 1980, the GDP rate of growth was 7.2 percent, compared
with 5.6 percent for the middle-income oil-importing countries.
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| Bridge of business |
The world slowdown by the late 1970s was mainly caused by the
rise in oil prices. The Thai GDP in 1982 was US$36.7 billion. It
rose to US$42 billion in 1985. The
projected rate of growth for GDP during the early 1980s was
around 4.3 percent as a result of falling demand and prices for
Thai exports despite a drop in oil price. It was apparent that in
the 1980s Thailand had lost its momentum; its Fifth Economic
Development Plan targets had not been met because of serious
macroeconomic imbalances, such as decreasing savings and
investment rates, increasing budget deficits, and increasing debt
and debt- servicing obligations. Whether Thailand could regain
its former momentum depended on the success of its Sixth Economic
Development Plan (1987-91).
Between 1970 and 1980, investment represented on the average 25.2 percent of GDP, compared with 24.7 percent by the mid-1980s. This proportion was one of the lowest investment rates in Southeast Asia. The national savings rate had fallen even more, from an average of 22 percent during the 1970s to around 17.8 percent by the mid-1980s. Hence, the average current-account deficit of 7 percent of GDP during the early 1980s had been caused by a declining savings rate rather than by an increase in investment rate. This imbalance was more serious than one caused by rising investment because rising investment could pay for itself with increased output and, possibly, increased savings so that debt could be repaid. With falling savings, foreign borrowing was used not to raise investment but merely to fill the investment-savings gap, which was mirrored in the external debt ratio of 39 percent of GDP and 146 percent of exports by the mid1980s . The total debt service ratio went up from 17.3 percent in 1980 to more than 25 percent by the mid-1980s. The increase was an important factor in the decision of the government to sharply reduce authorization for new commitments of public debt.
Between 1970 and 1980, investment represented on the average 25.2 percent of GDP, compared with 24.7 percent by the mid-1980s. This proportion was one of the lowest investment rates in Southeast Asia. The national savings rate had fallen even more, from an average of 22 percent during the 1970s to around 17.8 percent by the mid-1980s. Hence, the average current-account deficit of 7 percent of GDP during the early 1980s had been caused by a declining savings rate rather than by an increase in investment rate. This imbalance was more serious than one caused by rising investment because rising investment could pay for itself with increased output and, possibly, increased savings so that debt could be repaid. With falling savings, foreign borrowing was used not to raise investment but merely to fill the investment-savings gap, which was mirrored in the external debt ratio of 39 percent of GDP and 146 percent of exports by the mid1980s . The total debt service ratio went up from 17.3 percent in 1980 to more than 25 percent by the mid-1980s. The increase was an important factor in the decision of the government to sharply reduce authorization for new commitments of public debt.
Financial Institutions
Thailand had many types of financial institutions, subject to
different laws and regulated by different agencies. Most of them
were privately owned, but some were state owned. The primary
state-owned facility was the Bank of Thailand, which had
responsibility and authority for monetary control in its role as
the central bank. It served as the fiscal agent and the financier
of the government; regulated the money supply, foreign exchange,
and the banking system; and also served as the lender of last
resort to the banks. Other state-owned facilities included the
Government Savings Bank, the Bank for Agriculture and
Agricultural Cooperatives, the Industrial Finance Corporation of
Thailand, the Government Housing Bank, and the Small Industry
Finance Corporation of Thailand.

By the mid-1980s, the 30 commercial banks had 1,526 branches
handling the majority of all financial transactions in Thailand.
The 16 largest banks accounted for over 90 percent of assets,
deposits, and loans of the commercial banks, indicating a high
concentration and little competition in the banking industry.
Moreover, despite the impressive growth of banks, entrance by new
banks was limited.
Finance and security companies comprised the second largest group of financial institutions with assets equaling nearly 22 percent of those of commercial banks. Concentration also existed in the securities industry, the 5 largest companies (out of 112) holding 19 percent of all finance and security assets. The finance companies were created by many domestic and foreign banks to overcome banking restrictions. Although they were intended to increase competition with commercial banks, the objective was not met because many banks used the companies as an extension of their own activities.
Finance and security companies comprised the second largest group of financial institutions with assets equaling nearly 22 percent of those of commercial banks. Concentration also existed in the securities industry, the 5 largest companies (out of 112) holding 19 percent of all finance and security assets. The finance companies were created by many domestic and foreign banks to overcome banking restrictions. Although they were intended to increase competition with commercial banks, the objective was not met because many banks used the companies as an extension of their own activities.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE
International Trade
Thailand sustained a trade balance deficit from the early
1970s to the mid-1980s. Although the trade balance had improved
during the first part of the 1970s, it worsened after the oil
shocks of 1973 and 1979. In fact the net value of oil imports
went from US$52.5 million in 1970 to US$684.7 million in 1982,
with dependence on foreign oil reaching 75 percent in 1980 and
declining to 50 percent by 1985. Although there was a general
decline in the export performance of developing countries in the
early 1980s, Thailand's recovery from the oil shock was further
delayed by a loss in export competitiveness, a slowdown in the
economies of major trading partners, and a growing debt service
obligation resulting in part from rising interest rates. The
current account balance deficits were not as severe as the trade
deficits as a result of improving service balances. By 1986 the
balance of payments had moved into surplus on current account. The major contribution to the service
balance surplus was tourism, which increased from 630,000
tourists in 1970 to 2.6 million in 1986. Tourism was the top
foreign exchange earner from 1981 to 1986. The trade deficit was
caused in part by a decreasing growth rate of exports between
1980 and 1983, which improved slightly by 1985. The growth rate
of imports also declined, but at a slower rate. Despite an
increase in tourism, the trade deficit reached a peak in 1983 of
US$3.9 billion. In 1985 exports totaled US$7.1 billion and
imports US$9.2 billion, leaving an unfavorable trade balance of
US$2.1 billion. By 1986 the deficit had decreased even further,
with some of the reduction a result of the lower cost of imported
oil.

The composition or structure of merchandise exports changed
substantially between 1965 and 1985. Primary commodities
accounted for 95 percent of Thailand's exports in 1965, and
manufactured exports accounted for only 4 percent. By 1986
manufactured products comprised 55 percent of total exports, with
textile products increasing from less than 1 percent in 1965 to
13 percent by 1986. Other major
manufacturing exports in the mid-1980s included rubber products,
processed foods, integrated circuits, metal products, jewelry,
footwear, and furniture. Although agricultural exports as a
percentage of total exports declined during this period, rice and
other agricultural exports remained important for the Thai
economy. By the mid-1980s, rice took the highest share of total
agricultural exports. Cassava products, maize, sugar, rubber,
fruit, and marine products were the other main exports in this
category.
Between 1965 and 1985, the destinations of merchandise exports shifted from 54 percent of 1965 exports destined for developing countries to 56 percent of 1985 exports going to industrialized countries. This increase in the percentage of exports to industrialized countries, in combination with the changing structure of merchandise exports from predominantly agricultural to manufactured products, has fueled Thailand's economic growth. Thailand's major industrialized trading partners included the EEC, the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands. Furthermore, Thailand has developed significant trade relations with the newly industrializing countries (NICs) of Singapore, Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), and Taiwan. Additionally, Thailand has developed trade relations with Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and China.
Tariff barriers on imports from the developing countries had dropped with the implementation of the Tokyo Round (1973-79) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Rising nontariff barriers, resulting from domestic and international economic conditions in industrial countries, had more than offset the tariff reductions. In the United States the proportion of imports subject to such barriers more than doubled, and in the other industrial countries it rose by as much as 40 percent. Examples of nontariff barriers were quotas, voluntary exports restraints, the Multifiber Arrangements, sanitation rules, and subsidies.
Thai rice exports encountered the stiffest barriers in Japan, where the tariff rate was 15 percent and a global quota was in force. In the United States, tariff on rice was only 2.6 percent, and no explicit nontariff barriers existed except for stringent controls by the United States Food and Drug Administration. In the other industrialized countries, Thai rice exports faced varying levies. Thai agricultural exports to the developing countries met with stiff competition from subsidized United States cereal exports. Thailand entered into a voluntary export restraint with France for its cassava exports because of strong resistance to imports from the French producers of cereal-based animal feed. Rubber did not face major barriers except for quotas imposed by Japan. Maize exports did relatively poorly because of subsidized production and high tariffs in the industrialized countries. Sugar exports also faced subsidy problems in Western Europe and a 50 percent quota reduction by the United States. Despite nontariff barriers, Thai agricultural and manufactured exports faced less protectionism than the NICs in the early 1980s.
Between 1965 and 1985, the destinations of merchandise exports shifted from 54 percent of 1965 exports destined for developing countries to 56 percent of 1985 exports going to industrialized countries. This increase in the percentage of exports to industrialized countries, in combination with the changing structure of merchandise exports from predominantly agricultural to manufactured products, has fueled Thailand's economic growth. Thailand's major industrialized trading partners included the EEC, the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands. Furthermore, Thailand has developed significant trade relations with the newly industrializing countries (NICs) of Singapore, Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), and Taiwan. Additionally, Thailand has developed trade relations with Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and China.
Tariff barriers on imports from the developing countries had dropped with the implementation of the Tokyo Round (1973-79) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Rising nontariff barriers, resulting from domestic and international economic conditions in industrial countries, had more than offset the tariff reductions. In the United States the proportion of imports subject to such barriers more than doubled, and in the other industrial countries it rose by as much as 40 percent. Examples of nontariff barriers were quotas, voluntary exports restraints, the Multifiber Arrangements, sanitation rules, and subsidies.
Thai rice exports encountered the stiffest barriers in Japan, where the tariff rate was 15 percent and a global quota was in force. In the United States, tariff on rice was only 2.6 percent, and no explicit nontariff barriers existed except for stringent controls by the United States Food and Drug Administration. In the other industrialized countries, Thai rice exports faced varying levies. Thai agricultural exports to the developing countries met with stiff competition from subsidized United States cereal exports. Thailand entered into a voluntary export restraint with France for its cassava exports because of strong resistance to imports from the French producers of cereal-based animal feed. Rubber did not face major barriers except for quotas imposed by Japan. Maize exports did relatively poorly because of subsidized production and high tariffs in the industrialized countries. Sugar exports also faced subsidy problems in Western Europe and a 50 percent quota reduction by the United States. Despite nontariff barriers, Thai agricultural and manufactured exports faced less protectionism than the NICs in the early 1980s.
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| Export products sheet of Thailand |
Of Thailand's manufactured exports, textiles were most
affected by barriers because Thailand had to enter into bilateral
agreements with industrial countries, which were similar to the
voluntary export restraints under the Multifiber Arrangements. In
addition, tariffs escalated with the degree of processing. For
example, in the United States the average tariff for cotton
fabrics was 9.6 percent, whereas it was 18 percent for garments.
The United States imposed countervailing duties on Thai textile
exports in protest against Thai government subsidies to textile
exporters in the form of export packing credits, rediscount
facilities for industrial bills, electricity discounts, and tax
certificates.
Tariffs in Thailand before the 1970s were primarily used to generate revenues rather than to influence domestic production. The rates ranged from 15 to 30 percent, with higher rates applied to finished consumer goods imports. In the 1970s, however, tariff rates on finished consumer goods imports increased 30 to 50 percent. Rising protectionism continued in the late 1970s and early 1980s, with high tariff rates and the application of surcharges, quantitative restrictions, price controls, and domestic contents requirements.
Tariffs in Thailand before the 1970s were primarily used to generate revenues rather than to influence domestic production. The rates ranged from 15 to 30 percent, with higher rates applied to finished consumer goods imports. In the 1970s, however, tariff rates on finished consumer goods imports increased 30 to 50 percent. Rising protectionism continued in the late 1970s and early 1980s, with high tariff rates and the application of surcharges, quantitative restrictions, price controls, and domestic contents requirements.
External Debt
The Thai total long-term public and private debt grew from
US$728 million in 1970 to US$13.3 billion in 1985. The external
debt was increasing at a faster rate during this period than the
growing gross national product. In 1970 the
external debt was 11.1 percent of GNP, increasing to 36 percent
of GNP by 1985. The ratio of debt payments or debt service to the
total export of goods and services, one indicator of Thailand's
ability to meet debt payments, increased from 14 percent in 1970
to 25.4 percent in 1985. The growth of external indebtedness
averaged 25.2 percent between 1970 and 1980, compared with an
average of 21 percent for Southeast and East Asian middle-income
oil-importer countries. Public debt as a percentage of exports
went from 47.9 percent to 75.9 percent between 1980 and 1983, but
the proportion of public borrowing from foreign sources dropped
from 52 percent to 42 percent during the same period. This was
indicative of the growing concern of the public sector with the
enlarged foreign debt and hence a higher reliance on domestic
borrowing, which went from 48 percent to 55 percent during the
same period. In the early 1980s, Thailand was characterized by
high competition between the government and the private sector
for scarce domestic savings, which forced private firms to rely
more on external borrowing.
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| Business Balance sheet of Thailand |
The composition of Thai indebtedness in terms of interest
rates, maturity, and currency structure appeared to be better
than that in most other developing countries. Because of its high
credit rating, Thailand could borrow at about 8.4 percent in late
1983, compared with an average rate of 10.1 percent for other
middle-income oil-importer countries. It had also the longest
loan average maturity, 17.2 years compared with 12.2 years.
In terms of currency denomination, the Thai external debt
consisted mostly of two currencies: the United States dollar and
the Japanese yen, with increasing reliance on the yen because of
the willingness of Japanese banks to lend at a lower spread than
the other banks. Thailand was exposed to the risk of yen
appreciation in the early 1980s because Japan received only 14
percent of Thai exports while accounting for 26 percent of
imports. Meanwhile, the value of the yen had appreciated
substantially relative to the baht. The baht was pegged to the
United States dollar until 1984 when it had a fixed exchange rate
of B23 per US$1. Thereafter, the baht was pegged to a basket of
currencies and devalued by 14.8 percent against the dollar.
According to some observers, Thailand needed to revise its
external debt portfolio as well as limit its reliance on external
debt.





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